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The Flemish renewable electricity support system has struggled to address a number of problematic
issues in the past. These included excessive proﬁt margins and general malfunctioning of the green
certiﬁcate market, as well as a lack of qualiﬁcation of various existing renewable energy technologies.
The Flemish government responded to these issues by introducing major reforms in 2013, including
“banding” to differentiate the support for various technologies. However, reliable methods for differ-
entiating renewable electricity technologies and calculating support levels have not been sufﬁciently
developed. The main objective of the 2013 reforms was to reduce support costs, but application of
German feed-in tariffs on 18 reference technologies has shown that most projects in Flanders continue to
receive high levels of support. The 2013 reforms did not succeed in addressing malfunctioning of the
green certiﬁcate market. On the contrary, the conﬁdence of investors in renewable electricity plants has
decreased as the terms of support can be altered retroactively by adjusting remuneration levels and
through political interventions. Future adaptations are likely to be made which will further decrease the
overall stability and effectiveness of the system.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The primary areas of concern regarding current energy supplies
in the European Union are: (i) low shares of renewable energy
sources in the energy mix; (ii) negative impacts of energy use on
the global carbon cycle, and consequently on the climate;
(iii) increasing dependency of the European Union (EU) on energy
imports (higher than 50%) from non-EU countries [1,2]. In addition
to effectively reducing fossil fuel consumption through energy ef-
ﬁciencymeasures, increased use of renewable energy sources (RES)
mitigates current levels and future growth rates of atmospheric CO2actor; CREG, Commission for
eed-in Tariff; LCOE, Levelized
Photovoltaic; RE, Renewable
icity from Renewable Energy
conomic Council of Flanders;
rgy Agency; VREG, Flemish
aste Water Treatment.
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art.Ceulemans@uantwerpen.
Ltd. This is an open access article uemissions, but also decreases dependency on fossil fuels [2].
Furthermore, using electricity from renewable energy sources
(RES-E) provides favorable political, social and economic beneﬁts as
it increases domestic (local) employment, contributes to improving
the trade balance by lowering fossil fuel imports and offers greater
diversity of energy sources [3].
However, RES-E is still more expensive than electricity sourced
from established non-renewable sources, such as nuclear or fossil
fuels [4,5]. Investments in nuclear and fossil power plants have, in
many cases, been written off and their external costs are not re-
ﬂected in the cost of electricity [2]. To encourage a more wide-
spread deployment of RES for electricity production and an
optimized energy mix from a social-economic perspective, active
government interventions are necessary to correct market in-
efﬁciencies [6]. Nearly 120 countries have put in place various na-
tional and/or regional (ﬁnancial) incentives1 to support the
production of green electricity [7e9]. These incentives include
technology push measures, such as R&D grants and tax credits, and1 More than 150 different policy instruments to support green, low-emission and
climate-resilient investments were identiﬁed in a study of the United Nations
Development Programme (Glemarec, 2011).
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Evolution of the penalty for missing certiﬁcates at submission date (period
2003e2013). Source: [16].
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deployment incentives (green certiﬁcates, feed-in tariffs). An
optimal balance between RES-E subsidy schemes and policies that
catalyze corporate investments in RES-E technologies will be
necessary to decrease the overall burden of support on the gov-
ernment budget [10]. Many existing RES-E support policies have
been reformed and/or expanded numerous times following their
initial deployment [11].
This present work focuses on the 2013 reforms of the Flemish
renewable electricity incentive scheme based on tradable green
certiﬁcates (TGC), previously analyzed by Verbruggen [12e14].
Offshorewind energy has been excluded, since this is part of federal
jurisdiction. Our objectives are: (i) to describe the most important
changes resulting from the 2013 TGC reforms in Flanders; (ii) to
identify the missed opportunities of the new scheme compared
with the previous TGC scheme; (iii) to quantify the level of support
for 18 RE categories through the Flemish TGC as compared to feed-
in tariffs (FIT) assuming that German FIT rates would have been
applied to the Flemish RES-E installations and to their outputs. This
contribution is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the his-
tory of the green certiﬁcate scheme in Flanders and its impact on
the deployment of renewable energy (RE). Section 3 elaborates on
the data sources that were analyzed. Using these data sources,
Section 4 provides an overview of the 2013 TGC reform process and
discusses critical issues about the current reformed TGC system
relative to its previous version. Section 5 includes a simulation
exercise comparing the Flemish scheme with the FIT scheme using
the German FIT rates. The ﬁnal section summarizes the policy les-
sons and main conclusions.
2. Background of the RES-E policy in Flanders
In 2002, the Flemish government introduced a quota-based TGC
system to support the deployment of RES-E. With its introduction,
Flemish authorities issued one TGC for every 1 MWh of RES-E
generated by RES-E producers, irrespective of the technology or
source used [15]. There was no time limitation for obtaining TGC,
i.e. the certiﬁcates were assigned as long as the RES-E unit
continued to produce electricity. TGC are purchased by companies
that supply electricity. On a yearly basis, every March 31, the latter
must submit certiﬁcate quota to the Flemish Regulator for the
Electricity and Gas Market (VREG). The mandated quota equal
annually increasing shares of the suppliers' electricity sales of the
previous year. In addition to buying TGC, electricity suppliers have
the option of producing RES-E themselves for which they receive
additional TGC [15]. A high penalty is charged for the inability to
submit a certiﬁcate; this penalty also serves as the ceiling price for
TGC exchanges (Fig. 1).
In 2004, functioning of the free market slowed considerably
due to the fact that RES-E producers had the right to sell TGC at a
guaranteed minimum price to the distribution network company
located in their region. Distribution network companies are
required to buy certiﬁcates from RES-E units that are connected to
their distribution grids and commissioned on or after June 8,
2004 at a mandated minimum price over a period of 10 years [16].
This obligation was extended for PV beginning on January 1, 2006
with a payment plan extending over 20 years [17]. The obligations
introduced some differentiation by technology, as the minimum
amount of support differed depending on the RE technology used
[13] (Table 1). Since 2004, the minimum level of support for the
different RE technologies has changed several times, as shown in
Tables 1 and 2. The guaranteed minimum price and remuneration
period changed the most for photovoltaic (PV) power generation
(Table 2). Electricity supply companies were no longer interested
in buying PV TGC as their minimum prices were higher than thepenalty levels until mid-2012 (compare Fig. 1 with Table 2). The
high minimum support for PV was in fact the reason why PV
certiﬁcates were not offered in the TGC market. The obligation
imposed on distribution network companies to buy PV certiﬁ-
cates at prices higher than the TGC penalty level, assigns the
properties of an actual feed-in premium for PV owners to the
prices paid.
In addition to revenues earned from TGC sales at (posted or
negotiated) variable prices to power suppliers or at minimum pri-
ces to distribution network companies, RES-E producers earn rev-
enues from selling (physical) electricity to the grid, or from
lowering their electricity costs in case of own RES-E use. In addition
to RES-E support systems, a diverse range of direct and indirect
measures at different government levels (federal, regional and
municipal) exists to encourage RES-E investments. A full overview
of these support measures is beyond the scope of this article.
The number of TGCs issued in Flanders cannot be considered
to be a precise indicator of RES-E generated power, but is the
most representative indicator up to 2012 (Fig. 2a). Following the
introduction of RE support in 2002, the share of RES-E in the
electricity supply increased slightly from 0.6% in 2002 to 1.1% in
2004 [18]. Since 2004, minimum levels of support have been
guaranteed and the number of issued TGC is growing at a faster
rate, with the RES-E share in supplied electricity increasing to
7.5% by 2011 [18]. The impact of high support levels is most
explicit for PV: from 1356 certiﬁcates in 2006 to 1.95 million in
2013 [19]. The high support rate, combined with signiﬁcantly
declining investment outlays per kWp, resulted in a ﬁnancial
payback period of about ﬁve years for well-designed systems. The
high prices per MWh generated guaranteed surplus proﬁts over a
20-year support period. In 2013, a relapse of the increase of
assigned TGC for PV occurred.
Fig. 2b also reveals high growth in assigned certiﬁcates for
bioenergy, from 0.1 million in 2002 to almost 3 million in 2013,
with a slight decrease in 2013 as compared to 2012. Biomass from
separately collected or sorted organic waste, and biomass from
agriculture and forestry were the highest contributors to this
growth in terms of certiﬁcates with a 75% share in the bioenergy
mix in 2012 (Fig. 2b). The steep increase in 2005e2006 in the share
of biomass from agriculture and forestry is due to co-ﬁring biomass
in (existing) coal power plants. The surge of biomass from sepa-
rately collected or sorted organic waste is associated with the
eligibility of two existing biowaste incineration plants (81 MW and
55.7MW) and the commissioning of four new plants between 2004
and 2006 (installed capacity of 69.8 MW), followed by the addition
Table 1
Minimum support for various renewable energy technologies excluding solar photovoltaic panels. Source: [16].
Technology Minimum support during 10 years [V certiﬁcate1]
Unit commissioned
before Jan. 1, 2010
Unit commissioned
as of Jan. 1, 2010
Unit commissioned
between Jan. 1, 2012 and Dec. 31, 2012
Onshore wind energy, biomass (organic-biological substances)
and biogas (organic-biological substances)
80 90 90
Organic fraction of municipal solid waste, landﬁll and biogas
from waste water treatment
80 60 60
Biogas from fermentation of mainly agrarian ﬂows, biogas from
selected waste with composting
100 100 100e110
Hydropower, tidal and wave energy, geothermal energy 95 90 90
All other technologies for the generation of electricity from
renewable energy sources
0 60 60
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capacity of 110 MW [20]. The organic-biological fraction of
municipal solid waste (MSW) qualiﬁes for TGC beginning in April
2004, which explains the appearance of MSW incineration in 2004,
while this capacity had been available earlier [13]. The share of
biomass from agriculture and forestry decreased considerably in
terms of certiﬁcates issued in 2010 due to the fact that a part of the
electricity generated from coﬁring biomass was deemed no longer
eligible for certiﬁcates as of January 1, 2010.a3. Materials and methods
Initially, ofﬁcial documents issued between 2001 and 2014 by
several Flemish public authorities e the Flemish government, the
Flemish Energy Agency (VEA) and the Flemish Regulator for the
Electricity and Gas market (VREG) e speciﬁc to the Flemish
renewable electricity support system were analyzed (i) to describe
both the previous and current systems, and (ii) to illustrate the
most important changes and (potential) impacts on the deploy-
ment of RES-E. The methodology used to differentiate the Flemish
support, i.e. the ﬁnancial gap methodology (FG), was evaluated and
compared with the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) methodology
in terms of data requirements and objectivity.
Next, ofﬁcial documents issued by the German Federal Envi-
ronment Ministry (BMU) related to the FIT scheme were examined
to evaluate the technological differentiation applied in the
reformed Flemish support scheme with the differentiation pro-
vided by the German FIT scheme. Germany is considered as a
benchmark for RES-E policies [11]. To determine whether the 2013Table 2
Support for electricity generated by photovoltaic installations. Source [17].
Date of commissioning
of the PV unit
Minimum support
[V certiﬁcate1]
Duration of the support
guarantee [years]
July 2002eDecember 2005 150a 10a
January 2006eDecember 2009 450 20
January 2010eDecember 2010 350
JanuaryeJune 2011 330
JulyeSeptember 2011 300
OctobereDecember 2011 270
JanuaryeMarch 2012 250
AprileJune 2012 230
July 2012 210
AugusteDecember 2012 90 10
a In addition to the obligation on Flemish distribution network companies to buy
certiﬁcates from PV installations commissioned as of January 1, 2006, the Belgian
transmission system operator (ELIA) was obliged to buy certiﬁcates from PV in-
stallations commissioned after July 1, 2003 and before August 1, 2012 for a period of
10 years at 150 V certiﬁcate1 [16,17]. However, one certiﬁcate can only be sold
oncemaking the second option obsolete as of 2006, given the lower minimum price.reforms achieved their main objective, namely decreasing exces-
sive support for RES-E technologies, we compared the RES-E sup-
port by the reformed Flemish TGC system with the support
provided by the German FIT scheme. To make this comparison, we
used a simulation exercise to assess revenues for RES-E generators
earned from both sales of TGC and of physical electricity on one
hand, and through FIT on the other. The calculation methodology
applied to this simulation is presented in Section 5.1.4. Discussion and evaluation of the 2013 TGC reforms in
Flanders
4.1. Reforms of the green certiﬁcate scheme
The Flemish green certiﬁcate system has been subject to several
modiﬁcations since January 1, 2002. These changes failed to
address a major concern for the support system, i.e. excessive
proﬁts due to a lack of qualiﬁcation of RES-E technologiesb
Fig. 2. (a) Issued Tradable Green Certiﬁcates (TGC) by technology in Flanders from
2002 to 2012 - general overview. Source: [19]. (b) Issued Tradable Green Certiﬁcates
(TGC) by technology in Flanders from 2002 to 2012 - focus on bioenergy fraction
(WWT: waste water treatment; MSW: municipal solid waste). Source: [19].
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ciﬁc attributes and developmental phases, each requiring different
levels of support [14,22]. Regardless of their attributes, all RES-E
plants received one certiﬁcate per MWh production. As a conse-
quence, some technologies beneﬁted by free riding (e.g. coﬁring
biomass in old coal power plants), while other more innovative
technologies did not pass the hurdle rate (e.g. innovative biomass
conversion technologies as gasiﬁcation).
From January 1, 2013 onwards, banding factors (BF) are applied
to the issued certiﬁcates. RES-E plants are classiﬁed into 18 cate-
gories depending on the type of RE source, the technology and the
capacity of the power plant. The categories are assigned with a BF
based on the gap between estimated proﬁtability of reference
plants by category and preset returns on investments (ROI). For PV
plants with a peak capacity higher than 750 kWp, wind energy
turbines with a capacity higher than 4 MW, and other RES-E units
with capacities higher than 20MW, individual and speciﬁc plant BF
are determined at the time RES-E plant owners apply for support
[23].
The ROI calculations of RES-E plants assume ownership of the
technology by either private households (PV < 10 kWp) or by
companies (all other RES-E investments). The various owners are
assumed being submitted to different ﬁnancial conditions and rules
(e.g. tax regimes) that affect their ﬁnal net return on their in-
vestments, with varying demands on the hurdle rates. The “ﬁnan-
cial gap” (FG) is estimated on this basis as an annual amount of
subsidies required to guarantee the preset ROI. The subsidy is
expressed in V per MWh RES-E produced by the project.
The applied formula is [24]:
NPV ðFGÞ≡  I þ
XTbþTc
t¼0
OCFtðFGÞ
ð1þ rÞt ¼ 0 (1)
with FG ¼ the ﬁnancial gap, I ¼ the amount of the total investment,
Tb ¼ the policy period, Tc ¼ the construction period, OCFt ¼ the
operational cash ﬂow in year t, and r ¼ the desired return on in-
vestment (ROI) [25]. While this formula appears relatively simple at
ﬁrst glance, the effective calculation of the ﬁnancial gap is in fact
more complex due to the numerous parameters that need to be
considered in order to calculate operational cash ﬂow over the
considered period.
To implement the regulation, a large number of parameters for
the various reference technologies have to be ﬁxed. Examples of
these parameters are: electrical efﬁciency, generated electricity, full
load hours of the RES-E plant, share of RES-E in electricity used on
site, the owner's interest rate on bank loans, the owner's debt/eq-
uity ratio, the owner's taxation rate, etc. (see Appendix B for the full
list of parameters). Assessed ﬁnancial gaps (FG) in VMWh1 RES-E
are divided by a common banding divisor (BD) of V 97 certiﬁcate1,
to obtain the category speciﬁc BF (BF ¼ FG/BD). The BF represents
the number of certiﬁcates attributed to 1 MWh RES-E within a
speciﬁc category. The BF cannot be higher than 1 for plants
commissioned in 2013, and can never exceed 1.25 overall [24,26].
The BD is set atV 97 certiﬁcate1 as the Flemish authorities assume
that the average ‘market’ price will be somewhat lower than the
penalty, which is stipulated at V 100 per missing certiﬁcate as of
March 31, 2013 (Fig. 1). BF by category is re-calculated at least once
a year (twice a year for PV) by the Flemish Energy Agency (VEA) to
incorporate price evolutions. When the difference between the
initial BF and the updated BF is larger than 2%, the updated BF is
applied both to new installations and to earlier commissioned in-
stallations, inserting retroactive changes to assigned
remunerations.
To illustrate the 2013 reforms of the support scheme, we canconsider the practical example of solid biomass-ﬁred conversion
plants. Up to December 31, 2012 irrespective of the installed ca-
pacity, such plants received one certiﬁcate for every MWh of
electricity generated. Since January 1, 2013, each solid biomass-
ﬁred plant with an installed capacity up to 20 MW receives 1 cer-
tiﬁcate for every 1.02 MWh of electricity generated (BF for solid
biomass 20MW: 0.98). A plant larger than 20MWmust apply for
a project speciﬁc BF to be eligible for TGC support.
Insufﬁcient preparation for reforming the green certiﬁcate sys-
tem led to numerous missed opportunities [27]. We have identiﬁed
a number of items of concern as listed in Table 3 and discussed our
results in Sections 4.2e4.5.
4.2. Parameters used in the remuneration calculations
The parameters and the spreadsheet used for calculating FG of
the RE categories are made publicly available to increase trans-
parency and investors' conﬁdence in the reformed TGC scheme.
Included are general parameters as well as company speciﬁc pa-
rameters, such as company tax rates and investment tax reductions
(see Appendix B). The inclusion of company tax rates in calculating
the FG causes potentially considerable errors, as such rates vary
signiﬁcantly from the ofﬁcial Belgian company taxation rate of
33.99% assumed in the calculations [28]. The identiﬁcation of
effectively imposed proﬁt-related taxes requires an individual and
detailed business analysis for each investment, entailing the pro-
duction of annual accounts. Such an approach is not practical from
an administrative point of view.
Inclusion of the federal investment tax reduction, which is
allowed for RES-E investments, also depends on the imposed tax
rate and thus increases the aforementioned error. This triggers
the discussion on how and whether or not non-TGC support
should be included. Flemish farmers, for example, receive a 28%
investment subsidy for installations using RES, e.g. in cogenera-
tion units [29].
Pre-tax calculations, excluding company-speciﬁc parameters,
correspond more closely to a fair incentive scheme. A calculation of
the LCOE, following Eq. (2), which takes into account investment
and operating costs, as suggested by the IPCC [30], is preferred over
the complicated ﬁnancial gap calculations described in Section 4.1:
LCOE ¼
PT
t¼0
ðItþ MtþFtÞ
ð1þrÞt
PT
t¼0
ðEtÞ
ð1þrÞt
(2)
with It ¼ investments in the year t; Ot ¼ operating costs in the year
t; Ft ¼ fuel expenditures in the year t; Et ¼ electricity generation in
the year t; r ¼ discount rate or ROI and Tb ¼ policy period.
4.3. Technology qualiﬁcation
The 2013 reforms of the Flemish green certiﬁcate system were
intended to improve the cost-effectiveness of TGC remunerations
by harmonizing support levels on the basis of ﬁnancial gaps. By
setting remunerations at the level of the generation costs, windfall
proﬁts earned by low-cost technologies should be reduced or
avoided altogether. The 2013 reforms differentiate support levels
by classifying RES-E technologies into 18 categories. Identiﬁcation
of these categories appears to be arbitrary. Some categories include
conversion technologies with diverging attributes and capacities,
e.g. combustion of solid biomass with a capacity up to 20 MW is
placed in one category, whereas a 100 kWand a 20MW installation
differ signiﬁcantly in scale, in economies of scale, and therefore in
investment per kW and in operational costs per kWh. An addi-
tional, but insufﬁcient, differentiation by plant capacity (0e5 MW
Table 3
Items of concern about Flemish support for electricity from renewable energy sources before and after January 1, 2013.
Items of concern Up to Dec. 31, 2012 Reformed TGC scheme since Jan. 1, 2013
Parameters applied
in calculating speciﬁc
support levels
Not applicable Large number of parameters, including a number
of company-speciﬁc parameters (see Appendix B)
Qualiﬁcation Poor differentiation in minimum support;
no qualiﬁcation of RES-E technologies on
their merits. Exclusion of (expensive) less
mature, innovative technologies
Differentiation based on RE technology and unit capacity.
Limited qualiﬁcation for biogas and biomass technologies.
Exclusion of (expensive) less mature, innovative technologies (BF > 1)
Investment security Financial risk mainly due to price volatility
on the electricity and TGC markets. Guaranteed
minimum support offers safety valve for investors
Price volatility on the markets plus additional ﬁnancial
risks by uncertainty about future BF values depending
on annually re-calculated ﬁnancial gaps. Minimum support
also dependent on BF
Market functioning Poor functioning of the TGC market No adequate solutions offered in reformed system
Long-term vision No consistency and no long-term vision No consistency and no long-term vision
Grid compensation No additional grid compensation fees for RES-E units Grid compensation fees for small-scale RES-E units 10 kW
rescinded due to legal entanglements
Windfall proﬁts High windfall proﬁts for plants with marginal costs far
lower than TGC prices and by slow adjustment
of PV support levels
Limitation of windfall proﬁts by technological differentiation
and introduction of a project speciﬁc approach for the largest units
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for biogas technologies. A ﬁner sub-categorization on the basis of
the installed (peak) capacity, as applied in the German Renewable
Energy Sources Act, is lacking. This causes less accurate assess-
ments of levelized cost prices, and as a corollary, less effective in-
centives. Fine-tuning the regulatory treatment based on the
attributes of every RES-E ‘sourceetechnology’ combination would
allow for more precise classiﬁcation of the various combinations in
diverse groups with adapted incentive levels (BF in the Flemish
case) [31]. In addition to the unit capacity and the RE-category,
types of employed biomass or biogas fuels, and types of technolo-
gies deployed (conventional versus innovative, for example stan-
dard steam versus organic Rankine cycles) should be taken into
account [32]. Bonuses or increased BF for RES-E units using biomass
feedstock with additional (ecological) beneﬁts, or biogas upgraded
to natural gas quality and injected into the conventional gas pipe-
line, are not considered in the current scheme.
RES-E incentive policies are designed to support the deploy-
ment of RES-E technologies, but could also help in transferring or
remunerating external costs or beneﬁts. Cost assessments of
ecological impacts of the various RES-E ‘source-technology’ path-
ways could contribute to an improved qualiﬁcation of biomass or
biogas sources. Such assessments may suggest slight differences in
the support for plants within a given RES-E category. For example,
the European Commission's Costs Assessment for Sustainable
Energy Systems (CASES) revealed large differences in external
costs of biomass combustion systems depending on the source
used (straw versus wood-chips) [33]. For an estimation of the
actual emissions and the potential GHG savings e and thus the
external costs of RES-E  the whole life cycle should be considered
[34,35]. The GHG reduction potential of bioenergy depends on the
biomass feedstock, on the cultivation method, on the trans-
portation as well as on the conversion technology and efﬁciency
[36]. These elements should be taken into account in the design of
RES-E support measures to ensure that adequate support is made
available to the most beneﬁcial RES-E pathways. Currently, VREG
considers some socio-economic and ecological aspects in deter-
mining the number of TGC for biomass and biogas units as it only
issues certiﬁcates with a ﬁnancial value for units using resources
that meet the criterion of ‘social responsibility’, e.g. wood that can
be used for other (industrial) applications cannot qualify for TGC
with a ﬁnancial value [37]. However, no distinction in the level of
support is made between the different solid biomass sources that
qualify for TGC.The 2013 reform also provides the possibility for the Flemish
government to limit e by decree e the value of the BF, regardless
of the FG calculations [26]. Arbitrarily limiting BF to a maximum of
1 (during 2013) and of 1.25 (during the following years), limits
expenditure of the support system by only supporting those RES-E
technologies that are less expensive. Long-term innovation po-
tential, or local socio-economic beneﬁts and environmental ben-
eﬁts, may justify higher initial expenses, and thus BF with values
above the 1 or 1.25 thresholds. Innovative technologies are
generally expensive in their development phase, but become
economically feasible once they pass to maturity [38,39].
Decreasing unit costs by learning is demonstrated by PV, which
proved to be proﬁtable without government support in Flanders
following the abolishment of additional grid compensation fees
initially planned for small-scale PV (see Section 4.5). Focusing too
much attention on short-term cost-effectiveness lacks long-term
perspective necessary to deciding how the various RES-E tech-
nologies should be developed to contribute to an overall stable
and reliable electricity supply. Although the Flemish government
annually determines future RES-E targets, with indicative sub
targets for the different technology categories, this is not trans-
lated into targeted support within the TGC scheme (e.g. with
higher banding factors for targeted RES-E categories). Moreover,
these targets do not take into account the contribution of
deployed large-scale RES-E installations. An electricity system
based on 100% renewable sources can rely predominantly on wind
and solar supplies [40], but requires balancing and back-up power
from bio-energy based supplies or from other alternatives, such as
demand side management, imported electricity, etc. A well-
considered RES-E support scheme aimed towards developing
such an electricity system, one with the ﬂexibility to adjust sup-
port in a timely manner and on an as needed basis, is currently
absent in Flanders.
4.4. Investment security and market functioning
Flemish politicians [41] argue that the 2013 reforms intend to
offer investors a certain level of security by providing sufﬁcient
support to make investments in speciﬁc technologies proﬁtable.
Quota systems are praised for their ability to achieve certain pre-
deﬁned goals with respect to the future share of RES-E in the
energy mix [42]. But they are less reliable for the investors due to
the unknown level of future incentives, as this largely depends on
the TGC prices [3,22]. In 2004, Flemish legislators decreased the
Fig. 3. Flanders (2003e2013): Tradable green certiﬁcates (TGC) shortage or surplus at
submission date March 31, expressed as percentage (¼ [available, accumulated TGC]/
[TGC to be submitted] e 1). Source: [45,47].
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a safety measure for RES-E investors (see Section 2). This mini-
mum support also reduces downward pressure on TGC prices in
years when there is excess supply [42]. Also, the long-term
bilateral purchasing agreements for TGC, at prices that are ﬁxed
or linked to the average monthly transaction price, reduce the
downward pressure on TGC prices [43]. The 2013 reforms further
reduce the volatility of TGC prices by limiting their range by
equalizing the minimum price to V 93 certiﬁcate1 and decreasing
the penalty to V 100 certiﬁcate1.
However, measures aimed at mitigating excess proﬁts have
offered little reassurance for owners who invested in RES-E units
prior to the 2013 reforms and have led to decreased general con-
ﬁdence in the future of the TGC system. The retroactive limitation of
TGC assignment to a period of 10 years for projects commissioned
before the reforms (i.e. before January 1, 2013) is exemplary.
Obtaining an extension beyond the 10-year period is a tedious
procedure and depends on conditions related to full load hours or
unamortized investments. An extension is only possible if the
amount of received certiﬁcates is more than 5% below the pre-
determined amount. If this is not the case, the owner could
demonstrate unamortized investments in the RES-E unit of a
minimum ofV 100 000. The investments are required to have been
made before the end of the initial support period of 10 years, and
should exclusively consider essential components required for the
production of RES-E [44].
In theory, new installations commissioned after of January 1,
2013 face lower investment risks when compared to RES-E units
commissioned prior to the 2013 reforms, new installations receive
a minimum level of support that only can be changed on the basis
of new ﬁnancial gap calculations. Changes in the BF for new in-
stallations are contingent upon changes in electricity prices, i.e.
lower BF with increased electricity prices, and vice versa. However,
the signiﬁcant decrease of PV support following the abolishment of
grid compensation fees (Section 4.5) showed that other factors (in
this case, an exceptional legal entanglement impacting the PV
ownership costs) could also inﬂuence the BF, and thus the support.
The effectiveness of the (minimum) support is also affected by the
arbitrary cap on the BF and the calculation of the BF based on the
expected market price (V 97 per certiﬁcate) instead of the mini-
mum price (V 93 per certiﬁcate).
Large RES-E installations, which are not included in the 18
project categories deﬁned by the VEA, are required to apply for a
project speciﬁc BF calculated by the VEA based on the same pa-
rameters (Appendix B) as smaller RES-E units, without considering
socio-economic or ecological impacts. Although this BF can be
requested via a simple form, the assignment of the project speciﬁc
BF is dependent upon receiving approval from the Flemish Minister
of Energy, who can deviate from the suggested BF following
approval by the Flemish government. To date, two large biomass
RES-E units (230 MW and 600 MW) have received a BF with
considerable potential impact on the existing surplus of TGC.
The surplus of available TGC compared to the submitted TGC adds
to the market dysfunction. Since 2006, the surplus has accumulated
to reach almost 4.6 million certiﬁcates as of March 31, 2013, i.e. 120%
surplus certiﬁcates on top of the number of certiﬁcates submitted on
March 31, 2013 necessary to fulﬁll the quota (Fig. 3) [45]. This surplus
is the result of a combination of more certiﬁcates being issued
together with a barely increasing demand for TGC. The higher
issuance rate of TGC is partly due to the snowball effect of house-
holds and commercial investors responding to overly generous re-
munerations (the case of PV is most illustrative, given the steep
decline of investment costs per kW). Initial acceptance of the
organic-biological fraction of municipal solid waste for TGC remu-
neration since April 2004 also contributed to this increase.These failures showcase the inability of the Flemish authorities
to design, organize, monitor, and control the certiﬁcate market.
Prior to 2007, an automatic coupling between produced certiﬁcates
and the certiﬁcates to be submitted (¼quota) in the same year was
used, explaining the steep increase of excess since the decoupling
occurred without enhanced target quota for upcoming years
[14,46]. In 2012, the quota were changed and increased, and the
quota calculation methodology was adapted. As of March 31, 2013,
quota for individual electricity companies are determined based on
the following formula [26]:
C ¼ Gr*Ev*Btot (3)
with C ¼ amount of TGC to be submitted by a certain electricity
supply company in the year n, Gr ¼ an annually increasing value or
quotum that is determined by decree, Ev ¼ the total amount of
electricity, expressed in MWh, delivered by the electricity supply
company to its customers in the year n-1 and Btot¼ the ratio of the
number of acceptable TGC issued in year n-2 to the total gross
production of green electricity in year n-2 in the Flemish Region.
The increase of Gr from 2012 to 2013 (0.07 in 2012 and 0.14 in
2013) was largely countered by the introduction of Btot in the new
formula (which is lower than one) and the decrease of Ev to ensure
the competitiveness of energy intensive companies, paving theway
for additional surpluses. The surpluses increased considerably in
2013 despite these quota changes (Fig. 3).
The lack of a functional TGC market also decreases the in-
vestment security for both new and existing RES-E units, while
increasing the cost of the support scheme. Since the start of the
TGC scheme, the certiﬁcates have largely been exchanged on a
bilateral basis with mostly long-term contracts between RES-E
producers and electricity suppliers. While the bilateral TGC mar-
ket is a market in and of itself, it does not exert the effect of
common supply and demand. The ‘market players’ do not have a
role in establishing market equilibrium, nor on establishing the
market-clearing price, which differs from the average price of
bilaterally traded certiﬁcates determined by (mostly) long-term
agreements. Only a negligible amount of certiﬁcates were traded
on BELPEX's special Green Certiﬁcate Exchange [48]. Since its
launch in 2009, BELPEX organized 11 trading days with ﬁve days
without transactions (Fig. 4). As of 2011, BELPEX did not organize
trading days as very few transactions were anticipated due to the
Fig. 4. Flemish tradable green certiﬁcates traded at BELPEX Green Certiﬁcate Exchange
during the 11 trading days in 2009 and 2010 (an empty ﬁeld above a date indicates that
no certiﬁcates were traded that day). Both quantity and price are shown. Source: [48].
O. El Kasmioui et al. / Renewable Energy 83 (2015) 905e917 911market circumstances in the TGC scheme [49]. It is extremely
difﬁcult e if not impossiblee to establish a competitive TGC
market on top of a non-competitive conventional electricity
market [11,31]. The smaller spread between the minimum price
and penalty fees since the 2013 reforms will most likely increase
the dominant position of the distribution network company,
further decreasing the market functioning. The weighted average
price of bilaterally traded TGC was V 103.5 per certiﬁcate for the
period 2006-2012. The price was V 93.7 per certiﬁcate during the
submission period of 2013 [50].
The large existing and growing surplus of certiﬁcates, together
with the key role the distribution network companies play in
purchasing certiﬁcates, increase the debts of the distribution
network companies and threaten to increase future support
scheme costs since distribution network tariffs were frozen up to
the end of 2014 [51]. These costs will be transferred to either the
electricity consumers through a future increase in electricity dis-
tribution tariffs or to taxpayers in the case that certiﬁcates are
purchased by the government.
Higher risks involved with recovering investments due to the
volatile TGC market, combined with uncertainty about the future
evolution of BF and electricity sales prices for installations
commissioned on or after January 1, 2013, lead to an additional risk
premium further increasing support costs of the transition to RES-E
[22,52].4.5. Grid compensation fees for small-scale RES-E units
Although grid compensation fees e strictly speaking e are not
included in the Flemish RES-E policy, this measure is highly
interwoven with the policy of RE support, and therefore merits
discussion here. In Flanders, a system of net metering is currently
in place for small-scale decentralized RES-E facilities 10 kW
(mainly PV) connected to the grid under which electricity from
qualiﬁed facilities delivered to the utility grid may be used to
offset electricity provided by the utility during the billing period
[53]. Net metering makes use of a revolving meter that is able to
spin and record electricity ﬂows in both directions, spinning for-
ward when a customer draws electricity from the grid, and
backward when electricity is sent back to the grid. Alternatively,
customers can decide to install a second meter at their own cost tomeasure incoming and outgoing electricity ﬂows separately. In
both cases, the customer is only billed for the net electricity used
since excess energy sent to the utility is sold back at retail price
[53,54].
Since electricity customers contribute to the distribution grid
costs on a kWh basis and the majority of residential RES-E unit
owners have a revolving meter, these customers generally pay
little or no grid fees. This state of affairs was considered unfair
since RES-E owners make use of the distribution grid twice [55].
In response, the Flemish distribution system operators requested
the introduction of a grid compensation fee for decentralized
small-scale RES-E units with a nominal power up to 10 kW, which
was approved by the federal Commission for Electricity and Gas
Regulation (CREG), on December 6, 2012 [53]. On January 1, 2013,
a new grid compensation fee for residential RES-E unit owners
was introduced as a lump sum fee per kW installed RES-E
capacity. This grid compensation fee differed among
distribution network companies, distributed regionally, ranging
between V 44 and V 69 and averaging V 53.5 per kW installed
capacity [56].
Consequently, the Flemish government decided to grant small-
scale PV units one TGC for every 4347 kWh produced, as FG cal-
culations showed that this technology requires an incentive of V
22.6 per MWh to yield a ﬁxed ROI of 5% after the introduction of
these grid compensation fees [23,57,58].
Following a law suit ﬁled by the association of PV installers,
however, the Court of Appeal of Brussels declared the grid
compensation fee invalid and void in November 2013, because (i)
the grid compensation fee was based on a tariff methodology that
had not been approved, and (ii) the principle of equality was
violated since owners of large units were treated differently from
small-scale unit owners [59]. The grid compensation fee only took
into account the installed nominal capacity of the transformer and
not the real electricity production, as is the case for larger scale RES-
E unit (10 kW) owners who are required to install a second meter
[53]. The disappearance of the legal basis of this grid compensation
fee structure resulted in a repayment of all collected amounts by
the distribution system operators.
The consequences for the RES-E owners who opted to install a
secondmeter, at their own costs, instead of paying a lump sum grid
compensation fee, remain unclear. Small-scale RES-E owners who
received TGCs in 2013, based on the initially set BF, keep these
certiﬁcates if they have produced sufﬁcient electricity to obtain a
complete certiﬁcate. After February 17, 2014, no support has been
provided for PV units 10 kW commissioned in 2013 (BF: 0) and
electricity produced by these units no longer qualiﬁes for TGC
issuance. The sudden introduction of grid compensation fees in
response to the ‘injustice’ caused by the use of revolving meters is a
good example of the ill-considered and ad-hoc energy policy in
Belgium, which increases uncertainty for investors. Structurally
well thought through reforms of the RES-E policy have proven to be
essential to provide a stable legal basis to support necessary long-
term RES-E investments.
5. Estimating windfall proﬁts in the Flemish support scheme
This section presents an estimation of the windfall proﬁts in the
Flemish support scheme by comparing the RES-E support by the
reformed Flemish TGC system with the support provided by the
German FIT scheme. For this comparison, we simulated both rev-
enues for RES-E generators from TGC and physical electricity sales,
and revenues from FIT. This simulation is based on data gathered
from ofﬁcial documents issued by the German Federal Environ-
ment Ministry (BMU) and several Flemish public authorities (Sec-
tion 3).
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with German FIT
The Flemish authorities differentiated support for RES-E by
classifying the eligible RES-plants into 18 RES-E technology cat-
egories. For each of these 18 RES-E categories, the Flemish Energy
Agency (VEA) deﬁned one reference unit via an elaborated list of
parameters [23,58,60]. First, we calculated the support for these
18 RES-E units with the Flemish TGC scheme assuming the units
had been commissioned on January 1, 2013, and using the BF
effective on this date. An exception was made for small scale PV
(10 kW) since support for this category was revoked on
February 17, 2014 and this modiﬁcation applies for all small scale
PV units commissioned as of January 1, 2013 (see also Section
4.5).
We then applied the German FIT rates effective on January 1,
2013 to the different reference units depending on the deployed
RES-E technology and their respective rated capacity, by using the
methodology demonstrated in the German Renewable Energy
Source Act [61]. The most recent information, for the modiﬁed FIT
for solar energy in particular, was obtained from the website of the
German Federal Network Agency [62] and has been included in our
analysis. We applied only German base tariffs for the withhold
technologies, as Flanders does not differentiate further than the
subdivision in 18 RES-E categories. Therefore, details about the
statutory requirements or potential FIT increases or reductions,
from bonuses based on e.g. substance class of the feedstock used for
biomass technologies or the processing of biogas for feeding into
established natural gas networks [61,63], are not considered here.
Appendix A provides an overview of the base FIT rates guaranteed
by the German support scheme.
An electricity sales price ofV 50.6MWh1 is adopted for all RES-
E categories, based on the ENDEXyear-ahead price in 2012 [58]. We
assume constant electricity prices over the studied time period, in
contrast to the FG calculations by VEA that include yearly price
increases of 2%. Our assumption is based on electricity futures at
the ENDEX market; the futures reveal price stabilization, with even
a decrease in Belgium [64]. The TGC price is set at V 93 per cer-
tiﬁcate, representing the minimum support guaranteed by the
Flemish system.
The approach that we used to calculate the revenues through
the different support schemes involved two main steps. First,
revenues for an investor-operator of a RES-E plant were calcu-
lated for one operational year of the RESE-E plant in 2013. This
provided the differences in revenues between the two support
schemes without differences caused by unequal length of the full
support period. Second, the one-year revenues were extrapolated
over 20 years to quantify the impact of the length of the support
period on the net present value (NPV) of the total revenues.
German FIT are guaranteed for 20 years, whereas Flemish TGC are
only issued for 15 years after commissioning for wind and PV,
and for only 10 years after commissioning for other technologies.
After this period, the only revenues that RES-E generators receive
in the TGC scheme are revenues from the sales of physical elec-
tricity, as is also the case in Germany when the FIT period ends.
The annual monetary values were discounted using the return on
investment (ROI) reported by the VEA for the various categories.
By using different discount rates for the different RE categories,
we incorporated the differences assumed by VEA in risks asso-
ciated with the various investments.
5.2. Results and discussion
FIT are evaluated as the most efﬁcient and effective support
system for stimulating deployment of RES-E [7,65e67]. Wecompared the RES-E support by the 2013 reformed Flemish TGC
system with the support provided by the German FIT scheme, as
Germany is considered to be a benchmark for RES-E policies [22].
The comparison is based on assessed revenues for RES-E generators
through the sales of TGC and of physical electricity on the one hand,
and through FIT on the other.
For 11 out of the 18 reference units, the TGC scheme (including
the sales value of the generated RES-E) results in higher revenues
than the FIT scheme, when considered both over a period of one
year and over a period of 20 years (Fig. 5). Based on the predeﬁned
reference units (Table 4), the higher remunerated investments are
PV units  10 kWp, wind turbines  4 MW, biogas units  5 MW
and 20 MW for the digestion of mainly agricultural streams,
sewage sludge and other streams, and all biomass incineration
units 20MW, excluding the incineration of MSW. Three out of the
18 reference units (PV units of 125 kWp, biowaste fueled biogas
installations of 1.3 MW and of 7 MW) earn higher revenues from
TGC over one year, but there is a reversal in favor of FIT when
revenues are discounted over 20 years. The difference between
revenues through the TGC and FIT schemes for the three technol-
ogies is relatively small (max. 5%). Three reference units are
insufﬁciently supported through the TGC scheme as compared to
the FIT scheme, in particular RES-E generated from landﬁll gas
which is subdivided into two categories based on the capacity of
the plant. The BF of biogas units with a capacity up to 5 MWwas set
at 0.2. The BF is 0 for biogas units with a capacity between 5 and
20 MW, excluding the units from TGC support. This causes the
signiﬁcant difference (up to 32%) between the assessed TGC and FIT
revenues.
Differences between Flanders and Germany in the treatment of
digestion residues could objectify disparities in support for biogas
RES-E units. In Flanders, with its high agricultural nutrient sur-
pluses for the limited land area, digestate cannot be spread on
agricultural land without prior treatment [68]. Such treatment in-
creases the complexity of the RES-E units and investment costs. In
several areas of Germany, however, direct spread is of digestate is
permitted [69]. Stricter ﬂue gas treatment requirements for solid
biomass RES-E units in Flanders could further objectify differences
in support [70,71].
Electricity from the organic-biological fraction of MSW does not
receive FIT in Germany [63]. Since 2013, new MSW incineration
units no longer receive TGC in Flanders as the ﬁnancial gap calcu-
lations showed that MSW electricity generation is proﬁtable
without government support, while existing installations
commissioned before 2013 maintain TGC for a support period of 10
years [60].
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to investigate the robust-
ness of the results by changing the electricity price and the discount
rate, ceteris paribus. Both an increase and a decrease of the elec-
tricity price up to 20% largely conﬁrm the higher remunerations
from TGC demonstrated in Fig. 5. Decreasing (increasing) the
electricity price slightly reduces (increases) the difference between
FIT and TGC in the case of excess support, while considerably
increasing (decreasing) the differences in the case of a shortage, e.g.
for biogas from landﬁll. Only small-scale biogas from agricultural
streams, that showed limited excess support in the base case sce-
nario, is insufﬁciently supported with a 20% decrease of the elec-
tricity prices. The BF normally increases with decreasing electricity
prices, which provides additional support, but this is not possible
for this speciﬁc technology as it already has a BF of 1 (currently the
maximum BF). Additionally, adjustment of the discount rate to up
to 50% conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings, with only changes in sign for the
technologies that showed aminor surplus or deﬁcit in the base case
scenario.
The higher support provided by the reformed Flemish TGC
Fig. 5. Relative difference (%) between the revenues by 2013 Flemish tradable green certiﬁcates (TGC) and the revenues by 2013 German feed-in tariffs (FIT) for 18 RES-E reference
units (revenues: once over one year, once net present value discounted over 20 years) e Positive value: higher revenues through TGC; negative value: higher revenues through FIT.
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responds with the ﬁndings of earlier studies [14]. In 2012, the total
cost of the TGC scheme in Flanders amounted to V 992 million for
an overall RES-E generation of 6046 GWh (10.2% of the gross ﬁnalTable 4
Assessed revenues obtained by RE producers through the (Flemish) TGC scheme and (
explained in Appendix A and list of abbreviations]. Sources [23,58,60e62].
Categories U VU hel Electricity
generated
BF BF (max.) EVEL EVG
[kW] [h] [%] [MWh] [%] [%]
PV
PV  10 kW 5 850 100 4.25 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.
PV  250 kW 125 850 100 106 0.63 0.63 0.0 0.
PV  750 kW 400 850 100 340 0.49 0.49 0.0 0.
Wind
Wind  4 MW 2300 2000 100 4600 0.83 0.80 0.0 0.
Biogas ≤ 5 MW
Agricultural 1900 7000 39 5187 1.59 1.00 10.0 0.
Biowaste 1300 7200 39 3650 2.12 1.00 22.0 0.
Landﬁll 500 4600 35 805 0.20 0.20 2.0 2.
Sewage 290 3000 32 278 0.21 0.21 2.0 2.
Other 2000 7000 39 5460 1.66 1.00 10.0 0.
Biogas ≤ 20 MW
Agricultural 7000 7000 39 19,110 1.24 1.00 10.0 2.
Biowaste 7000 7200 39 19,656 1.48 1.00 22.0 2.
Landﬁll 5500 4600 35 8855 0.00 0.00 2.0 2.
Sewage 5500 3000 32 5280 0.00 0.00 2.0 2.
Other 7000 7000 39 19110 1.33 1.00 10.0 2.
Biomass ≤ 20 MW
Solid 10,000 7900 26 20,540 0.98 0.98 2.0 2.
Liquid 800 3000 40 960 1.92 1.00 1.2 10.
Biowaste 10000 7900 26 20540 0.83 0.83 2.0 2.
Municipal Solid Waste 7167 7800 20 11,181 0.08 0.00 2.0 54.electricity consumption), without considering the additional rev-
enues for RES-E generators through the sales of physical electricity
[51,72]. The support for Flemish RES-E generators thus averaged V
164 MWh-1, on top of the sales or savings of electricity valued atGerman) FIT scheme, based on the listed parameters [acronyms and abbreviations
SC ZAEL PEL,ZA r Rated
capacity
Average
FIT
Total
revenues TGC
Total
revenues FIT
[%] [V kWh1] [%] [kW] [V kWh1] [kV] [kV]
0 100 0.217 5 0.49 0.170 11 9
0 65 0.151 5 12.13 0.169 218 223
0 65 0.132 5 38.81 0.151 599 639
0 0 n.r. 8 525 0.088 5215 3974
4 0 0.111 12 1518 0.114 4208 3973
0 30 0.111 12 1068 0.146 2958 3113
0 0 0.187 12 263 0.085 378 499
0 90 0.111 12 99 0.067 243 136
0 10 0.111 12 1598 0.114 4661 4171
4 0 0.104 12 5594 0.104 15,321 13,395
0 30 0.104 12 5753 0.139 15,507 15,907
0 0 0.104 12 2888 0.063 3284 4059
0 90 0.104 12 1884 0.060 3796 2333
0 10 0.104 12 5594 0.104 16,037 13395
0 40 0.083 12 9018 0.087 19,762 13,081
0 40 0.111 12 274 0.131 978 930
0 30 0.083 12 9018 0.087 17,667 13081
2 30 0.083 10 14,692 0.000 5630 5630
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value obviously depends on a number of factors, such as the
ownership of the RES-E unit (private household vs. company), share
of self-consumption, etc. [58].
In Germany, RES-E generators received V 19.12 billion of FIT
support for an overall RES-E generation of 143.8 TWh in 2012
(22.9% of the gross ﬁnal electricity consumption), including the
non-supported RES-E technologies [73,74]. This yields an average
support of V 133 MWh-1, illustrating the large difference in total
revenues between RES-E generators in Germany and Flanders.
Several studies have indeed shown that countries, which adopted
the FIT scheme, generally provide less support while demonstrating
higher deployment rates of RES-E [22,66,75,76]. A well-designed
FIT system ensures high future price certainty throughout the
lifetime of the RE project. This increased security for investments
decreases costs of the transition to RES-E as it provides a downward
pressure on the price of borrowing, it reduces the request for high
ROIs and it stimulates technological development, which also
contributes to reducing costs [32].
6. Conclusions and recommendations
We assessed whether the 2013 reforms of the Flemish TGC
scheme remedy important shortcomings of the system: missing
qualiﬁcation of RES-E technologies, excess proﬁts and dysfunction
of the TGC market. At the onset, the concept was that a TGC
market system was feasible and would dominate other support
systems in effectiveness and efﬁciency. This initial belief was
based on the adage ‘the market picks the winner’, implying ‘equal’
treatment for all RES-E technologies, sources, and power plants.
Avoiding individual qualiﬁcation of technologies, sources, and
plants was an essential component of the TGC market based in-
strument. It was also predicted that this would be the source of
systematic and signiﬁcant so-called windfall or excess proﬁts for
mature technologies which could potentially experience such
strong growth that the “system would implode under its own
weight” [12]. Based on both previous issues, it proved to be almost
impossible to start and run a TGC market based instrument that
could merit the label of being a market. Very few transactions took
place, and it was evident that regulatory and political in-
terventions determined certiﬁcate pricing rather than forces of
supply and demand.
As a surrogate for proper qualiﬁcation of RES-E supplies and
cataloging them into collectively exhaustive andmutually exclusive
classes, technology bands introduce a certain degree of differenti-
ation of RES-E, but fail to fully qualify RES-E by taking into account
all relevant attributes of the various ‘source-technology’ combina-
tions. Fine-tuning of remunerations, as conceived and demon-
strated by the German FIT scheme, is still far away. Total expenses
for the Flemish support system are reduced by imposing a ceiling to
the BF of 1.0, regardless of ﬁnancial gap calculations. This contrib-
utes to preventingmore expensive, but potentially promising RES-E
technologies, from receiving support needed for development and
practical deployment. More rigorous R&D policies may provide a
solution regarding technology development, but the deployment of
innovative technologies in new real-life circumstances is depen-
dent on sector policies covering items such as industrial innovation,
regional development, climate change, and environmental
protection.
The Flemish authorities intended to establish a competitive
artiﬁcial TGC market on top of a non-competitive electricity
market. However, no functional TGC market was successfully
created. With the large surplus of certiﬁcates and with a limitednumber of actors holding dominant positions in the power
sector, the future for a workable TGC market does not look
promising. The way in which Flanders initiated extensive reforms
to its TGC scheme in 2013 does not offer a sufﬁcient solution to
this issue.
Politicians are motivated to reduce total costs of the TGC sys-
tem, speciﬁcally by focusing on mitigating excess proﬁts. By
excluding medium to large RES-E units from the predeﬁned RE
categories, investors are required to ﬁle an application for a project
speciﬁc BF which determines whether their RES-E projects will
receive any support. In most cases, the support is necessary to
obtain funding from shareholders and ﬁnancial institutions. The
retroactive limitation of TGC eligibility to 10 years for units
commissioned before the reforms further decreased the general
conﬁdence of investors.
Up to 2012, the Flemish TGC scheme was characterized by high
excess proﬁts due to the lack of qualiﬁcation of the technologies
and sources, and to the slow adjustment of PV support levels,
when solar panel investments signiﬁcantly declined. Our simula-
tion exercise comparing the revenues for 18 RES-E reference
plants in the 2013 Flemish systemwith the revenues that the same
plants would receive if submitted to the German FIT scheme,
conﬁrms the continued occurrence of excess proﬁts. Further, this
supports earlier ﬁndings that higher support is required to
compensate for lower investment security under TGC schemes.
The obvious volatility of the RES-E support policy also impacts
investment security by increasing the required return on in-
vestments for investors.
Despite these observations, it is too early to determine the
overall impact of the implementation of the 2013 TGC reforms on
RES-E deployment levels in Flanders. Given the considerable
decrease of support for biogas units for the recuperation of landﬁll
gas and for the digestion of sewage treatment sludge andmunicipal
solid waste incineration plants, investments in these technologies
will likely be cut back given that no new units have been
commissioned in the ﬁrst semester of 2013 [77].
The 2013 reforms are presumably not the last, since the share
of green electricity in the total electricity production in Flanders
is still limited as compared to the zero carbon economy and the
issues discussed in this contribution will only become worse if
no adequate solutions are provided. Therefore the Flemish
support scheme would be served by a scientiﬁcally based and
thoroughly deliberated reform. In the end ‘green’ electricity
producers would beneﬁt from a fair, transparent and consistent
support system. A reliable and long-term support system allows
investments and the development of robust technology and
industrial policies, all needed for the full development and
deployment of RES-E.Acknowledgements
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applicable for installations commissioned on January 1, 2013.
Sources: [61,62].German FIT levels (as of January 1, 2013) V kWh1
PV
10 kW 0.1702
10 kW e 40 kW 0.1614
40 kW e 1 MW 0.1440
1 MW e 10 MW 0.1178
Wind energy
Base tariff 0.0480
Initial tariff for 5 years 0.0880
Biogas and biomass units
150 kW 0.1401
150 kW e 500 kW 0.1205
500 kW e 5 MW 0.1078
5 MW e 20 MW 0.0588
Biowaste fermentation
500 kW 0.1568
500 kW e 20 MW 0.1372
Small manure digesters
75 kW 0.2450
Landﬁll gas
500 kW 0.0847
500 kW e 5 MW 0.0580
Sewage gas
500 kW 0.0669
500 kW e 5 MW 0.0580Appendix B. Parameters used by the Flemish Energy Agency
(VEA) for calculating ﬁnancial gaps. Source: [24].Symbol Description Unit
U The electrical capacity of the unit [kWe]
hel The net electrical efﬁciency of the unit [%]
EVEL Internal use of electricity by the unit, to determine the net green electricity production (share) [%]
EVTGC Share of the gross green electricity production not qualiﬁed for TGCs [%]
Ki Speciﬁc overnight capital investment per unit of power [V kWe1]
r The desired return on the total investment (ROI) [%]
E Equity capital share in the total investment [%]
rd The interest rate on the bank loan [%]
Tb The policy period [year]
Ta The depreciation period [year]
Tc The construction period [year]
Tr The period of the bank loan [year]
i The part of the investment eligible for investment allowance [%]
IAP The percentage of the investment tax reduction [%]
VU The average annual full load hours [h]
ZAEL The use of electricity for own consumption (share) [%]
PEL,ZA The avoided cost of electricity in case of own consumption (year 0) [V kWh1]
PEL,ZA,t The avoided cost of electricity in case of own consumption in year t, before actualization [V kWh1]
PEL,V The sales market value of electricity in year 0 [V kWh1]
PEL,V,t The sales market value of electricity in year t, before actualization [V kWh1]
PIN The cost for the fed-in electricity in year 0 (feed-in tariff) [V kWh1]
PIN,t The cost for the fed-in electricity in year t, before actualization (feed-in tariff) [V kWh1]
PTVB The market value excluding taxes, levies and avoided grid costs of the avoided primary fuel for the same quantity of useful heat in year 0 [V kWh1]
iEL,ZA The expected average yearly change of the avoided costs of electricity for own consumption [%]
iEL,V The expected average yearly change of the sales market value of electricity [%]
iPBW The expected average yearly change of the market value of the avoided primary fuel for the same quantity of useful heat [%]
lV The discount value of the replacement investments per power unit in year 0 [V kWe1]
KV The ﬁxed costs per power unit year 0 [V kWe1]
KVar The variable costs per unit of electricity generated in year 0 [V kWh1]
iOK The expected average yearly change of the market value of the operational costs [%]
(continued on next page)
(continued )
Symbol Description Unit
PB The price of fuel in year 0, including ﬁnancing costs for the purchase of fuel [V kWh1]
iB The expected average yearly change of the market value of the fuel [%]
MIS The quantity (mass) of incoming material on a yearly base [ton]
POIS The costs or revenues from the incoming material per ton in year 0 [V ton1]
iIS The expected average yearly change of the market value of the incoming material [%]
MUS The quantity (mass) of outgoing material on a yearly base [ton]
POUS The costs or revenues from the outgoing material per ton in year 0 [V ton1]
iUS The expected average yearly change of the market value of the outgoing material [%]
b The corporate tax rate [%]
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